Critical Role of the International Monetary Fund IMF in the Global Financial System as an International Lender of Last Resort: Effect from Mexico, Russia, And Zimbabwe by Benson O., Njoku
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                             www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.2, 2013 
 
91 
 
Critical Role of the International Monetary Fund IMF in the Global 
Financial System as an International Lender of Last Resort: Effect 
from Mexico, Russia, And Zimbabwe 
Njoku Benson O. 
Michael Okpara University Of Agriculture, Umudike 
Department Of Banking And Finance, College Of Management Sciences 
E-mail; benson_njoku@yahoo.com 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to have an in-depth look on how the International Monetary Fund has operated in the 
global financial crisis and how it has strategically manoeuvred itself as an international lender of last resort as it 
tackles economic collapses in various affected economic countries. The paper addressed key points on how the 
International Monetary Fund reacts to  global crisis and how it sets up financial assistance within an economy who 
seeks financial assistance. The paper however, evaluated the IMF's effects on Mexico, Russia and Zimbabwe who 
had in the past faced with the same financial situation under different circumstances. Also, the future trend of the 
International Monetary Fund was discussed thoroughly to determine whether it will continue to act as an 
international lender of last resort or will it adopt a new measurement of unilateral and regional approaches to create 
sustainable solutions to future lending among key countries in time of financial distress.  
Key Words: IMF, MEXICO, RUSSIA, ZIMBABWE, TEQUILA CRISIS/PESO CRISIS.  
 
1. Introduction 
The International Monetary Fund has established itself as a significant fund institution in the world economy. 
Moreover, it has become an independent organisation throughout the years, developing and reconstructing its 
objective to meet global stability and economic reform. There have been several unique programme of the IMF 
which has made it an institution of international lending. Throughout history, financial crisis have been the defining 
point of the IMF and has created the expansion of the structure in which it was fundamentally established. The 
International Monetary Fund is a leading lender of the emerged market countries and continues to involve itself in 
the assistance of economic relief and reformation. The ideal of each country equally being involved was the principle 
focus of the IMF but it was not design to take on the conditions of a country that was facing problems of poor 
policies and contributing external effects from outside contributors. The fundamental structure of the IMF was 
intended for countries that faced difficulty in trade and balance of payment problems or required short term loans so 
that trade would continue to exist among member countries. However over time the role of the IMF has transformed 
itself from a short term lender, into a long-term bailing out institution for countries during financial crisis. Today, it 
gives the impression of an international lender of last resort, because of how it has reacted in the past decades, in 
helping the economies of member countries with financial crisis. It has proven itself over time especially when it first 
relieved the pressure of financial instability in the Russian, Mexican and Asian crisis, respectively, which has giving 
the IMF a standing point in becoming an international lender of last resort. The IMF has continuously grown to pride 
itself the leading lender, just as a financial crisis manager  devices intervention plan, with economic reforms to 
establish an apprehensive approach to global financial recovery. In addition, it has been very successful to obtain 
extensive funding from rich economic countries and has acted as relief during financial crisis. 
 
 Its major objective has always been to keep the world economy financially stable through economic times. 
Furthermore, in recognitions of the Mexican, Russian and Zimbabwean economy, this paper is based on the adaption 
of the IMF involvement within each country’s economy and how it has relieved economic pressures or increased the 
pressure of relief during policy making decisions. Mexico, Russia and Zimbabwe are three countries with some 
similarities on the extent of contributions of the International Monetary Fund to stabilising their economy, though, 
funding and policies differ amongst them.  The paper also covers various economic conditions in which IMF faced, 
and how each country was supported. Throughout the financial destitution, these countries had managed to establish 
the role of the IMF, and their eligibility to perform one task that has transpired in to its role of a lender of last resort. 
Also, the research of Russia, Mexico, and Zimbabwe focuses on the similarities of the financial assistance and the 
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overall result of each country which faces the same dilemmas but different results due to different conditions IMF 
put in place to overturn the current condition and to prevent further decline. Furthermore, the prevention from the 
reoccurrence of the same situation, by strengthening the country’s economic system in which it governs itself. 
Observing the obstacles of each country and the IMF, and it role as the international lender of last resort, this paper 
however, subjected its evaluation on the past- lending activities, including IMF's policy, and condition of funding in 
Russia, Mexico and Zimbabwe respectively.  
 
 
2. IMF and Mexico 
Mexico is one of the 45 allied nations present at Britton Woods, New Hampshire, United States at the conception of 
International Monetary Fund during the United Nation Monetary and Financial Conference. Mexico is also among 
the top 20 member countries in terms of voting power and the first country to use the new instrument called Flexible 
Credit Line (FCL) designed to cushion the effects of current global financial crisis. 
 
Since the 1970’s, Mexico has always been bailed out from their financial crisis by IMF or the U S treasury 
department.  IMF and U S treasury has been lending to the Mexican government once they faced financial crisis. 
After the government of President Luis Echeverria who tripled his country foreign debt was offered a loan worth 
$1.2 billion in 1976. In 1982, President Jose Lopez Portillo, quadrupled Mexico foreign debt and created a 17 
percent GDP fiscal deficit, the IMF gave Mexico more than $1.8 billion as a bail out. In 1988, International monetary 
fund and the United States treasury department intervened in the Mexico financial crisis again by providing more 
than $3.5 billion following a devaluation of the Peso. (Vasquez 1997). 
Again in 1995 IMF provided $17.8 billon as a stand-by support. Because of this various financial support, IMF as a 
lender of last resort to Mexico cannot be over emphasised because it has contributed immensely to rescue Mexico 
from two or more major financial crisis; Tequila crisis1 of late 1994-1995, the global financial crisis of 2008-2010 
this is not to mention other Special Drawing Right (SDR) i.e. $1.8 billon provided in 1982 and $3.5 billion in 1988. 
(William 2005).  
 
According to IMF survey, on 17 April, 2009 the executive board of IMF approved $47 billion credit line for Mexico 
and stated that they were the first country to show willingness in the IMF flexible credit line introduced in March 
2009 to strengthen strong economics against fallout of the global financial crisis. 
 
1
Tequila crisis- is also known as Peso crisis. It became an effective crisis when Peso was devalued in December 
1994. 
In 1997, Vasquez stated in a journal of world affairs that with the intervention of International monetary fund and the 
U S treasury department once Mexico is faced with financial problem is a moral hazard because there is a predictable 
reaction of bailout from the fund to respond to their economic crisis. He further stated that this will encourage 
financial distress. The policy makers in Mexico can afford to misbehave and act irresponsible in making financial 
policies, and that Investors will become less cautious about their investment knowing they will not be held 
responsible against their policies and actions and there is a ready remedy. 
 
IMF and Mexico bailout episodes enumerated above 1976, 1982 and in 1988, the principal and remote cause was 
poor monetary policy born by the government election year concern. In 1984 – 85 Stephen stated in Houston journal 
of international law that the Mexican government had used the IMF loans granted them for three purposes:  (a) To 
service their debts owed to foreign and various creditor. (b) For foreign exchange purpose, that is to meet up their 
balance of payment deficit and pay for imported goods and services. (c) To guide against the further devaluation the 
Peso so this fund from IMF was used for speculative purpose. 
 
Furthermore the government wanted exchanged controls to operate in interaction with other course of action adopted 
and pursued such as approving the rescheduling foreign, private and public debt. With this rescheduling of these 
debts they will be able to ration the scarce foreign exchange and channel it priority uses. Payment to the suppliers of 
essential imported commodities and essential foreign debt payment were first targeted. By so doing, the government 
believe they will be relieving Peso from short term drop in value and then they could concentrate on a longer term 
solution: promotion of Non oil export and reducing government deficit etc. 
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The Peso or Tequila crisis of 1994-1995 was very devastating because Mexico was achieving high market 
orientation progress. However the policymakers failed to tighten policy when they should and they also increased 
their spending by 11.6 percent resulting to 4.7 percent of GDP budget deficit unreported in 1994.  
Tequila crisis in Mexico also referred to as ‘el error de diciembre’  meaning the December mistake by President 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari2 became effective in December 1994 after the sudden devaluation of the Mexican currency 
called Peso hence it was also called Peso crisis. 
 
Before this crisis, four peso was exchanged to a dollar but in the space of one week during the crisis the peso crashed 
and 7.2 peso was exchanged for a dollar which led to the speedy intervention of the US, IMF and other economic 
organisation. The loans and guarantee granted to Mexico to suppress the effect of the crisis was totalled almost $50 
billion including IMF 18 month’s stand-by credit agreement of around $17.8 billion. 
2
President Carlos Salinas- He is a Mexican economist and politician. He was the president of Mexico from 1988-
1994 
 
 Frederic (1999) states in a journal of banking and finance the basic lesson from the  
tequila crisis are the Danger of Pegged Exchange Rate: The devaluation of Mexico currency as a speculative attack 
on exchange rate has an ironic effect on the economy because the financial market information flow has been 
hampered. When exchange rate is pegged then depreciation of the domestic currency is a non-linear event because it 
means that the currency has to be devalued. Secondly, there was no strong prudential supervision of the banking 
system in Mexico which has affected the health of its financial markets resulting to financial crisis. Mexico as an 
emerging market needs strong prudential supervision of their banks because banks plays a very important role in 
channelling funds to those who has opportunities and willing to invest productively.  
 
Lastly, the speedy liberation and deregulation of the financial system is also a lesson from the crisis because in 
Mexico this was not done gradually and proper checks were not put in place. If proper bank’s supervisory structure is 
not in place when deregulation comes, then the constraints of risk taken may be non existence. In many countries 
lending booms have been featured because financial liberation often leads to lending boom and has often been 
followed by banking crisis as also the case of Mexico before the Tequila crisis. 
 
The use of IMF assistance to bailout countries whose banks cannot satisfy its creditors, discharge liabilities or not 
solvent is not proper because such assistance and doctrines that has underlies it are  threats to the stability of the 
entire financial system (Charles 1998).  This paper observed that for the past 30 years, Mexico has experienced 
different monetary and currency crisis because of its poor monetary and fiscal policies. In various crisis enumerated 
above, IMF and U.S treasury comes up with a bailout of an increasing amount. Although in 1998, Vasquez states that 
bailout by IMF and the US treasury is very expensive and unjust. 
IMF has played a role of lenders of last resort to Mexico and therefore may weaken the reliability of their central 
bank because going through various analysed financial crisis from 1976 to date, you will notice that the IMF 
intervened at the right time by providing the fund that is required for economic crisis bailout. 
 
The Rubin doctrine introduced by the Clinton administration in 1995 was aimed to protect developing countries from 
free market because their losses can be socialized. This was adopted by IMF during the Tequila or Peso crisis in 
Mexico which had crippled their financial system.  The bailout has contributed greatly during the  financial crisis, 
and protected the Mexicans economy from further financial problems   but it has a negative scenario to the 
developing countries that they can engage in risky financial practice because if their business fails and there are 
unpaid loans, taxpayers in the developed countries will use this doctrine of IMF to bail them out.  
 
Also recently, Flexible Credit Line (FCL) introduction by the IMF in 2009 which had provided Mexico government 
with a credit facility of $47 billion to hold up as a precautionary measure against the global financial crisis. The 
disbursement of this Flexible Credit Line is not conditioned on compliance with the traditional IMF supported 
programmes and recently the credit has been elongated for another one year. 
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3. IMF and Russia. 
The Financial crisis struck Russia’s economy in 1988. During this period, Russia had introduced various economic 
measures to end the crisis; setting out government reform Agenda and involving the International Monetary Fund for 
a macroeconomic stabilisation. The financial assistance by the fund would depend not only on its policies but also 
taking into considerations the domestic conditions in Russia. This paper intends to review the funds existence in 
Russia during 1990s.  
The head of government, Yeltsin in October 28, 1991, articulated an economic programme which aimed at 
revamping Russia’s economy. He presented an economic reform agenda to the international organisations and to 
accept the basic principles set out for a possible invitation of the International Monetary Fund for reconstruction and 
development. He also requested the fund to work out a detailed and economic oriented work plan for participation 
and cooperation for the Country’s economic stabilisation. (Nigel and Ngaire 1999).  
According to Nigel and Ngaire (1999), the presence of the IMF in Russian’s economy in 1991, was likened to be 
stronger. In June 1, 1991, the fund had agreed to lend the first $1 billion monthly support, following the 
memorandum of understanding reached between Russia and the IMF. Gaider and Camdessus, the country’s Deputy 
Prime Minister Economic Policy, and the IMF Director acted as representatives for both parties. During this period, 
the west only granted Russia an associate membership to the fund in October 1991, and was reluctant that if granted 
full membership it would draw heavily from the fund when it has not met the criteria for a full membership. It  
further suggested that the IMF should work in closed coordination to help actualise the reform programme already 
put in place by the government. This includes the immediate stabilisation through spending cuts, tax-increases and 
price liberalisation. It also recommended the privatisation of small and large enterprises. 
 
Struggle for supremacy erupted between the president and parliament. As a result of the IMF’s economic policy 
agenda, industrialists felt that this would not favour them and had shifted their support to the parliament to garner 
favour for more credit facilities. The rift was another prelude to economic instability in Russia and had caused 
serious impediment to the reform agenda.  (Nigel and Ngaire 1999) 
Russia in June 1992, secured its full membership with the IMF. The reform recorded an increased growth and had 
caused the removal of over 90 per cent of the consumer prices and 80 per cent of the producer prices, liberalisation 
of the internal trade, and a controlled inflation in an economy that has suffered a macroeconomic imbalance.    
In a related development, the IMF offered its second $ 3 billion credit loan to Russia from the new Systemic 
Transformation Facility (STF)1. This was a new experiment for the IMF, mostly, for the member countries 
experiencing severe economic disruption in its trade and payment arrangement, as a result of a shift from significant 
reliance on trading at nonmarket prices to multilateral market based trading. There was no condition attached to the 
new Systemic Transformation Facility (STF), implying that the recipient. Providing more support through a standby 
arrangement however, half of the STF credit was initially extended with the remaining $1.5 billion. 
 
IMF lending support programme recorded another upheaval in September 19, 1993 to 1994. The Fund decided to 
suspend forthwith, its lending programme to Russia on the bases that the government has failed on their part to cut 
down the rate of inflation and embrace necessary steps in the budget area. The interest disparities between the 
Executive and parliament over economic policies control, and poor policy implementation of Chernomyrdin 
governments’ loose budgetary and monetary policy. This caused inflation to have risen suddenly from 4 per cent to 
15 per cent a month in 1994. In 1995, IMF’s programme in Russia recorded a tremendous growth. Before this 
period, they had applied a dimension of lending support with less conditionality, using the Systemic Transformation 
Facility from 1993 to 1994, which yielded less success. The fund however, reverted to its traditional approach of 
strict, non-concessional standby arrangement with aggressive monitoring. 
IMF was observed that macroeconomic stabilisation would not lead to sustainable long-term growth unless deep 
institutional changes were also followed.  The mutual relationship that existed between Russia and the fund was 
reflected during one year $6.8 billion standby arrangement that was announced on the April 11, 1995. This was 
reported as the largest IMF loan to date with the exception of Mexican bailout. At this stage, inflation was expected 
to fall to 2 per cent of the gross domestic product GDP Subsequently, strict measures were introduced to ensure the 
effectiveness of the 
1STF: Systemic Transformation Facility; measure introduced by the fund to release money to Russia and other 
member countries  
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 programme which includes a monthly monitoring against the former quarterly, a closed working group comprising 
of the representative from Russia’s Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, and the staff of the International Monetary 
Fund.    
 
The progress recorded by Russia was highly appreciated by the IMF at the end of 1995. Irrespective of all the 
political pressures, Russia was seen to have responded to its reform programme as expected by the IMF. In 
reciprocation to that, the fund introduced an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) to the Russian economy signed on March 
1996 of a sum totalling $10.2 billion, which was expected to be disbursed monthly over the period from March 26, 
1996 to March 25, 1999. The EFF was in anticipation for another condition requesting Russia to further reduce its 
fiscal deficit to 4 per cent of the GDP in 1996 and to 2 per cent in 1998. Also, the condition was for Russia to cut 
down its rate of inflation to 1 per cent a month by the end of the year. (see appendix 1) 
 
Russia was conditioned to undertake structural reforms which aimed at privatising the agricultural sector of the 
economy and elimination of all export duties. Furthermore, total restructuring of the banking sector, proper auditing 
of the largest enterprises and improvement in tax collection. The actions and influences associated with IMF 
approval were considered highly significant at this point. The agreement created an atmosphere for a compound re-
invigoration of Russian’s $38.7 billion debt with the official creditors of Paris club in April. In return led to the 
Country’s transverse to international capital markets as a sovereign borrower and the eventual floating of several 
successful Eurobond issues.  
However the financial assistance given to the Russian government by the IMF may have delayed it from adopting an 
appropriate reform measure which could have helped to stabilise its financial system. Maintaining measurements 
adopted by the IMF in resolving the crises in Russia were considered commendable, however, Sachs argued that IMF 
credits should have been used not just to build reserves, but to assist in the non-inflationary financing of the deficit. 
He also viewed the crisis as a run on the bank when he argued that the IMF should have provided sufficient funds to 
end the run. The IMF’s insistence upon market reform conditions in this context just deepens the loss of confidence 
that caused the country to undertake unnecessary and costly policy changes. IMF has not done what it was supposed 
to do in the case of Russia, to provide sufficient funds to ending the financial crisis inherence in the country. This has 
caused serious impediment to the development of Russia (Stiglitz, Conway, and Fischer, 2006).   
 
4. IMF and Zimbabwe 
The purpose of selecting Zimbabwe for the study is because of its participation in IMF’s Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility (ESAF), and the IMF’s concessional lending facility for one of the least African developed 
countries. The ESAF was established in 1987. ESAF is the IMF’s discounted lending facility for the least developed 
countries. Under ESAF’s IMF offers low interest rate and its repayment term is five and a half to ten years. There is 
a condition of receiving these loans. Countries must have to adopt IMF’s structural adjustment programs from 
privatization of government controlled units, minimising the barriers to trade as well as to foreign investment and 
ownership, also reducing government spending, monetary tightening, and the reduction in government subsidies. 
 
Over the years, Zimbabwe faces a wide variety of difficult economic problems. Its involvements in the war drained 
millions from the economy. The government had set-up reforms programs which badly damaged the commercial 
farming sector, traditional exports, and foreign exchange. This impacted Zimbabwe’s government, which had to 
enter into agreements with the World Bank in the late 1980’s. Zimbabwe began structural adjustments in earnest in 
1991 when it signed a standby arrangement with the IMF in exchange for a $484 million loan. Unlike many of the 
countries under take IMF adjustment programs, Zimbabwe did not institute structural adjustment in  
response to a crisis. After several years of economic stagnation, Zimbabwe turned to the fund and World Bank in an 
effort to jump start economic growth. Due to the support by IMF, Zimbabwe has to adopt changes in its policy as it 
is required by the IMF in exchange for the loans were cuts in its fiscal deficit, tax rate reduction and the de-
regulation of financial markets also dismantle protection for the manufacturing sector and de-regulate the labour 
market, lowering the minimum wage and eliminating certain guarantees of employment security. From this view 
point of the IMF, labour market rigidity was a factor which was constraining future growth potential and keeping the 
fiscal deficit high in Zimbabwe.   
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When IMF came to Zimbabwe in 1980’s, it largely dodged the famines, civil strife and mismanaged government 
policies, which was common in sub Sahara African countries. In 1980, Zimbabwe maintained positive growth of 5 
percent (GDP growth per year) and unlike other African countries, agricultural yields were large enough to allow the 
country to export gain. After the implementation on IMF policies in Zimbabwe, in 1992 its real GDP fell by nearly 8 
percent in that year. From 1991 to 1996 manufacturing output of the country contracted by 14 percent and Real GDP 
per capita declined by 5.8 percent from 1991-1996. In the following decade, Zimbabwe economic growth slowed and 
government policies were less than efficient, but Zimbabwe still managed to grow an average of 4.3 percent, in real 
terms. However, between the year 2000 to 2003, the government initiated land reforms policy in large scales. These 
land reforms marked an important turning point for Zimbabwe. After implementation of these reforms, Zimbabwe’s 
economy collapsed by 5 percent in 2000, 8 percent in 2001, 12 percent in 2002 and an estimated 18 percent by 2003. 
The government of Zimbabwe faces different economic problems, which includes shortage of foreign exchange, 
increase inflation and supply shortage. Inflation reached 500 percent and Zimbabwe dollars was more than 99 
percent of their real exchange value. (Gibbons 1997 and Richardson, 2004).  
  
Between 1991 to 1996, formal sector employment in manufacturing fell by 9 percent and real wages fell by 26 
percent, this due to the reduction in public spending and deregulation of labour market which led to higher 
unemployment in Zimbabwe. 
 In order to meet IMF’s fiscal target in the 1991 ESAF program the government had to reduce non-interest 
expenditure by 46 percent. From the study it is found unsurprising that Zimbabwe never met its fiscal target nor did 
Zimbabwe meet the IMF target between 1990-91 and 1995-96. The expenditure on health care declined as a shore of 
the budget from 6.4 percent to 4.3 percent and as a share of GDP from 3.1  
percent to 2.1 percent. The IMF recommendations for fiscal adjustment included reductions in the real wages of 
public health sector workers. As a result many government medical staff moved to the private practice or private 
sector which led to decline in the quality of public health, which also led to non affordable of public services to 
poor’s. Compare to the previous situation of 1980’s, health care services were widely more available to people. The 
decline in government health care spending resulted the spreading of diseases, as a result AIDS rapidly increased in 
the community (Richardson, 2004). Government spending on education also fell under IMF adjustment. As a result 
time real per capita expenditure on primary and secondary education declined by 36 percent in 1990-91 and 25 
percent in 1993-94 respectively. As in the health sector, wages for educational staff fell by between 26 percent and 
43 percent between 1990 and 1993 (Goldsmith, 1995).  
 
The IMF policies could not help Zimbabwe to improve its economic condition. Zimbabwe’s GDP, Per Capita 
Income went down. Also, there was a fall in its level of education and health facilities, standard of living of its 
people and as a result Zimbabwe finds itself under the huge debt. ESAF program were not suited for the Zimbabwe 
economy. Policies such as reduction in government expenditure led to economical imbalance in the country and the 
funds policy is in monetary tightening, which is related to increase in taxes, even when the economy of the country is 
weak.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Over the decades speculations of its existence to continue with good governance and accountability has been heavily 
questioned, mostly of its actions to rectify financial situation by providing compensative leverage. In perspective the 
IMF in fairness is an organisation primarily set up to ensure that every member economy is  functioning under stable 
economic condition, and that it remains stabilised as economic relief  is implemented into the country fiscal 
structure.  
 
Conclusively, the overview of Russia, Mexico and Zimbabwe, shows discrepancies in the role of the IMF. The 
International Monetary Fund can be described as an international fund institution that can be referred to as a lender 
of last resort. However, transforming the IMF into an international central bank will alter the architectural form from 
a short-term provider into a govern body that will have to adapt international strategy mechanism. In the reference to 
our case studies, we can conclude that IMF has been exploited as an organisation that does more harm than good, 
especially since most underdeveloped countries seem to dwindle more, due to the capacity to adjust than most rich 
countries. Russian had not developed as much as it was intended to do. Instead its economy started to deteriorate 
almost as much as Mexico but not as large of a scale as Zimbabwe. The equilibrium of the core structures do not fit 
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underdeveloped countries and lack the main criteria to adjusts to certain frameworks, for this, Zimbabwe was 
hopeless against the fight to financially survive. The adjusted policies that the IMF imposes, has to do with vital cuts 
in the basic resources such as education, healthcare and also cutting down the imports which mostly includes food 
and basic supplies. There is always a debate in whether the judgement of the IMF is the right action when it comes to 
stability or can their policies be less harsh and more considerate to the people of the country.  
  
During the financial crisis of 1995 in Mexico, the International Monetary Fund stepped in to perform a function of 
lender of last resort. Because of the peso taking a significant falls in the exchange market. However, the extent of 
what the original purpose of the IMF may have evolved unknowingly, but looking at Mexico Russia and Zimbabwe 
it acted as a lender of last resort.  
Nevertheless, becoming the last resort through financial crisis, and global instability, can be the cutting future for the 
IMF, but their needs requirement more of a formation when dealing with specific countries.  
Looking at the Mexico, Russia and Zimbabwe the IMF only causes a quick relief and substantial consequences. It is 
an easy bailout package to countries that are in desperate need but are these countries able to pay the rate of interest 
and adhere to their stiff conditions. 
Mainly, the IMF will be more complex and complication will arise as it acting as an international lender. By refuting 
the past misfortunes that has happen with other countries that are yet to recover from the provisions of the IMF, the 
IMF will not have the transparencies to do so. Its efforts of providing short-term credit continue to be the main goals. 
The outlook of Mexico, Russia and Zimbabwe implies that it success rate is not effective in the long run and, many 
countries will continue to worsen economically because of the provisions it has imposed. Furthermore, many 
countries are considering have inter-continent emergency banks among regions where money will be put aside in 
case a financial crisis occurs, the same way the IMF lends, but on a smaller scale where it meets sub-continent 
requirements on a multilateral scale. Lastly, can the IMF should find a balance of structure that will suit all countries 
when it comes to international lending and capital control that are not fragmented on the  
regularity system and create room for flexibility on a multilateral contributor of a lender of last resort?  The IMF is 
best suited to continue the role of credit services and refining the existing structure than taking a role of the emerging 
world central bank. 
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